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Abstract 
 
The present paper highlights the imbalances that have characterized the Eurozone during the crisis. The 
contribution focuses on the issue of current account imbalances and the factors that caused them. It also 
examines the banking union as an important step toward a better management of the Eurozone financial 
imbalances. Furthermore, the paper discusses and assesses the policies, especially monetary policy, 
implemented in the Eurozone, stressing the limits of the strategy pursued by the European authorities. The 
main purpose of the paper is to point out possible solutions in order to correct the imbalances and discuss 
changes in Eurozone policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The present paper highlights the imbalances that have characterized the Eurozone during its long crisis. The 
contribution focuses on the issue of current account imbalances and the factors that caused them. It also 
examines the banking union as an important step toward a better management of the Eurozone financial 
imbalances. Furthermore, the paper discusses and assesses the policies, especially monetary policy, 
implemented in the Eurozone, stressing the limits of the strategy pursued by the European authorities. The 
main purpose of the paper is to point out possible solutions in order to correct the imbalances and discuss 
changes in Eurozone policies. The ultimate goal is to have a more balanced and integrated Euro zone which is 
able to pursue stability, less divergence and political credibility. 
 
2. Policies, institutional flaws and the crisis in the Eurozone 
 
Before the crisis, the governance in the Eurozone was based on a fiscal policy which remained at national 
level, although constrained by the Growth and Stability Pact. At the same time, national authorities were 
deprived of the exchange-rate instrument and national discretion over last resort lending for macroeconomic 
management. The ECB was and still is an independent EU official institution, in charge of handling the single 
currency and the monetary policy with the narrow remit of ensuring price stability1. Consequently, monetary 
policy has resulted to be independent from fiscal policy. In addition, the ECB did not monitor the banking 
sector, since bank regulation and resolution, as well as the regulation of financial markets, were left to national 
governments. Although in the years before the crisis the increasing integration of Eurozone financial markets 
determined a growth in capital flows and banking − an increase that undermined the ability of some member 
states to backstop their national banking system −, there was no strategy in terms of harmonization of rules 
and surveillance of the financial sector in the EMU (Schilirò, 2017). The EMU lacked a developed surveillance 
framework to track and correct the imbalances in financial markets, sovereign debts, and competitiveness 
(European Commission, 2017). Thus, the stabilizers that existed at the national level prior to the start of EMU 
were stripped away from member states without being transposed at the monetary union level. This left the 
member states unable to deal with the coming national disturbances (De Grauwe, 2013). At the same time, 
financial deepening reached a certain level within the monetary union, due the concurrent progress of financial 
integration and financial sector growth, and it left the Eurozone facing a policy trilemma.  
 
                                                          
1Article 127(1) of TFEU.  
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As Obstfeld (2013, p.3) explained, the following three conditions cannot be maintained simultaneously: (1) 
cross-border financial integration, (2) financial stability, and (3) national fiscal independence2. The growth of 
the balance-sheets in the banking system is a related aspect of financial deepening that gave rise to the “doom 
loop”, linking the solvency of banks to that of the sovereign debt (Obstfeld, 2013). Tabellini (2015, p.1) 
observes that: “in order to preserve financial integration and avoid future crisis”, the trilemma implies the need 
of “adequate common fiscal resources to cope with both systemic banking crisis and sovereign debt runs”. On 
the institutional side, the rules laid down in Maastricht and imposed on the Eurozone member countries were 
intended to preserve the system, not to favour political integration and social cohesion among those countries 
(Mody, 2015). But this form of institutional framework revealed its flaws. In fact, it encouraged the 
accumulation of lasting imbalances at the expense of the Eurozone’s weaker countries and determined a 
widespread dissatisfaction towards the single currency and its system of rules (Schilirò, 2017). The crisis 
emphasized the inadequacy of the governance in the Eurozone, and the single currency was put at risk. 
Actually, the European monetary union has been characterized by a complex institutional system where the 
intergovernmental decision-making system has dominated the so-called Community method (i.e. the co-
legislative decision-making system), posing a problem of legitimacy. Even more so, the intergovernmental 
decision-making system has caused direct clashes between national governments. Thus, there is a need for a 
change in the political approach of EMU governance (De Grauwe, 2010). But this change also requires a 
reshaping of the institutional framework, so that the Eurozone can aim at stability, cohesion and development 
on a lasting basis. However, this new approach needs the strengthening of the euro governance at supranational 
level on a solid legal basis. This, in turn, would require substantial changes to the European treaties, which 
represent the real challenge, even though such changes are unlikely to be achieved in a short time (Schilirò, 
2014; Schilirò; 2017). 
 
3.Current account imbalances 
 
Economists have focused on different aspects of the Eurozone crisis. This section focuses on current account 
imbalances. Today, there is a broad consensus among economists that it was a mistake to concentrate primarily 
on fiscal aspects. Alessandrini et al. (2014), for instance, through empirical evidence, highlight that fiscal 
imbalances of Southern countries have certainly contributed to exacerbate the Eurozone fragility, but the latter 
cannot be interpreted only as the result of fiscal indiscipline. These authors, instead, give greater importance 
to market liquidity in times of uncertainty that suggests a shift from a fiscal to a balance-of-payments crisis, 
which is in turn driven by labor productivity differentials between north and south. Fiscal stance, indeed, plays 
an important role because its spillover effects can be massive, but it is also necessary to look at what happens 
to competitiveness, current account balances and credit cycles. Several economists highlight with different 
modes the current account imbalances, the cross-border capital flows, and the divergence in competitiveness 
as the core issue of the crisis in the Eurozone economy (Holinski et al., 2010; Werner-Sinn and 
Wollmershaeuser, 2011; Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Werner Sinn and Valentinyi, 2013; Cour-Thimann, 
2013; Higgins and Klitgaard, 2014; Alessandrini et al., 2014; Baldwin, Beck, et al. 2015; De Grauwe, 2015). 
Baldwin, Beck et al. (2015), particularly, searching for a consensus view of the crisis narrative, argue that the 
real culprits were the large intra-Eurozone capital flows that emerged in the decade before the crisis. According 
to their view, a balance of payments crisis became a public debt crisis, due to the sudden stop of capital flows 
that raised concerns about the viability of banks and governments in nations dependent on foreign lending, 
while slowing growth produced increasing public debt ratios.  
 
Even though among the economists there is a large consensus on the fact that peripheral countries built up very 
large current account deficits and external debts, the discussion is about the causes. Competitiveness, 
particularly, is at the heart of the debate. De Grauwe (2013) argues that the countries of Southern Europe have 
not only supported greater costs but they have been hampered in their ability to stabilize their economy in the 
event of asymmetrical shocks. This happened because their loss of competitiveness was attributed by the 
European authorities to the policy mistakes of the government of the peripheral countries. Thus, this loss 
justified the need for fiscal austerity and structural reforms. In particular, internal devaluation, which included 
nominal wage cuts, was considered the key point to restore competitiveness as a medium-long term policy.  
 
                                                          
2 Obstfeld (2013) observed that a country reliant mainly on its own fiscal resources will likely sacrifice financial integration as well 
stability, as it is true in the Eurozone, because markets will then assess financial risks along national lines. 
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De Grauwe underlines that the first best policy would have been for the debtor countries to reduce and for the 
creditor countries to increase spending. Thus, the necessary austerity imposed on the Southern European 
countries could have been offset by demand stimulus in the Northern European countries. This proposal of 
symmetric rebalancing, that is to say, surplus countries need to make converse macroeconomic adjustments 
by stimulating demand (for instance, through tax cuts, wage rise and investment) is also shared by Posen 
(2010), Mody (2015), Dodig and Herr (2015), Onaran and Stockhammer (2016), and other economists, but 
unfortunately it has been dismissed by the European authorities. Dodig and Herr (2015), in particular, highlight 
that European institutions seem not to have understood that the EMU is a monetary union without sufficient 
institutional integration. In addition, they underline that the absence of the central bank’s explicit commitment 
to be a lender of last resort for the governments undermined the credibility in the liquidity and solvency of 
individual member states. This, in turn, made the deficit countries vulnerable to sudden stops of capital inflows 
and panic in financial markets. Wyplosz (2013) emphasizes the importance of domestic demand and disagrees 
with the view that the lack of competitiveness of the deficit countries is mainly due to excessive increase in 
wages and prices. Essentially, he argues that the loss of competitiveness in these countries was a mere 
reflection of the increase in demand, determined in turn by a loose monetary policy, not the cause of the current 
account imbalances. Comunale and Hessel (2014), applying the idea of Wyplosz to the data, provide an eclectic 
view. They suggest that the link between credit and current accounts has been very important in the Eurozone 
crisis. By introducing the so-called financial cycle, which is mainly driven by credit and house price growth, 
Comunale and Hessel (2014) show that domestic demand fluctuations at the frequency of the financial cycle 
are the main driver of current account dynamics, whereas changes in competitiveness play only a minor role. 
Thus, these authors call for more emphasis on credit growth and macro prudential policy, in addition to the 
current attention for competitiveness and structural reforms. 
 
Another view is provided by Matthes and Iara (2016). They observe that, though downward rigidities (i.e. 
insufficient adjustment during recessions) of wages are still considered a rooted problem of Eurozone, notably 
in its southern European members, “the Eurozone debt crisis immensely increased reform pressures” (Matthes 
and Iara, 2016, p.20). Consequently, relatively wide-ranging structural reforms in labour and product markets 
have been taken in most stressed EMU countries (OECD, 2015). These reforms have raised wage flexibility 
and have thus also reduced downward rigidities (Anderton and Bonthuis, 2015; ECB, 2016), especially because 
wage rigidities are closely related to the rigidity of regulations3. Moreover, Verdugo (2016) provides evidence 
for Italy, Spain, and Portugal where wages appear to be considerably less rigid than usually depicted. 
Furthermore, he points out that in eight major Eurozone countries real wages are nearly as responsive to the 
economic cycle (unemployment) as in the United States and that their responsiveness has further increased 
during the crisis. Unger (2016) focuses, instead, on credit factors. This author, through an empirical 
investigation of the relation between domestic credit developments and the current account balance, shows 
that flows of bank loans to the non-financial private sector are a significant determinant of the current account. 
Finally, Picek and Schröder (2017) partly criticize the internal devaluation solution, but, at the same time, they 
consider the view that Northern Europe and in particular Germany should run expansionary policies in the 
common European interest as misleading. These authors by running simulations of current account rebalancing 
scenarios in the Eurozone, based on a closed multi-country input-output model, suggest that the spillover 
effects of domestic demand booms in the Northern surplus countries are non-negligible, but not large. This 
result implies that although the spillover effects cannot on their own create a meaningful upswing in the former 
Southern deficit countries, however an expansion from the Northern countries can create the necessary policy 
space for a domestic demand-driven expansion in the deficit countries by relaxing the balance of payments 
constraint. In conclusion, this literature seems to suggest, despite the concerns and the view of the European 
authorities, that wage increases or downward rigidities in the Eurozone do not appear very significant, and that 
the loss of competitiveness is not the only key determinant of current account imbalances.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 This is especially relevant for reforms taken in the wage bargaining systems which should allow to better align wages with cyclical 
conditions, productivity developments, and the needs of smaller companies. 
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Anyway, while several Eurozone countries built up external deficits in the period of global financial crisis 
(2008-2009) and during the euro crisis (2010-2015), others recorded significant surpluses (e.g. Germany, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands) (Eurostat, 2016)4. After 2013, some countries, especially those in the 
periphery of the Eurozone that recorded large pre-crisis deficits, had experienced significant diminishing 
external imbalances (e.g. Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia)5. The reasons were probably associated with the 
spike in real interest rates, the stabilization of domestic demand and growth contraction, improvements in 
relative cost and prices, and, lastly, the decline of oil prices (ECB, 2015). Esposito and Messori (2016) also 
show that the elimination or the drastically reduction of current account deficits of peripheral countries, in 
particular since the end of 2014, is a result which is more dependent on the contraction of their GDP and 
relative reduction in their average real wages than on productivity increases in their economies. All this 
confirms the key role of domestic demand and austerity measures. 
As regards the movement of capital between the Eurozone countries during the sovereign debt crisis, capital 
flows aggravated the difficulties of the peripheral countries since they did not target the more productive 
sectors, in many cases feeding real estate bubbles. Some peripheral countries, given their large external debts, 
could not finance their deficits through capital inflows, since a sudden stop in the inflow of private capital was 
determined by a loss in creditors’ confidence regarding the solvency of these countries (Merler and Pisani-
Ferry, 2012)6. This sudden stop required macroeconomic rebalancing and appropriate policies to improve 
competitiveness. The adjustment process was cushioned by the single monetary policy through harmonized 
short-term interest rates. Moreover, the ECB offered liquidity assistance measures (i.e. liquidity-providing 
credit operations, outright transactions, etc.) and through TARGET2  ̶ the payment infrastructure of the 
Eurosystem −, financed the current account deficits of the peripheral countries (Schilirò, 2013). Since 
imbalances were mainly addressed through internal devaluation, deficit countries have tried to restore 
international competitiveness by aggressively reducing labour costs, coupled with fiscal consolidation, in order 
to lower their product prices7. The overall short-term effect of this internal devaluation and austerity measures 
has been to weaken domestic demand. Given the lack of an offsetting increase in external demand of surplus 
countries undertaking a reflationary stimulus, these measures have undermined economic growth and, hence, 
the public finances of the deficit countries. To restore competitiveness, it would be convenient to implement 
productivity-enhancing reforms that improve long-term economic prospects, as suggested by Estrada, Galì and 
Lopez-Salido (2013), Posen and Ubide (2014), Bini Smaghi (2015). Unfortunately, Eurozone member 
countries have taken the benefits of the single currency for granted without acknowledging their shared 
responsibility, so the ECB’s monetary policy had to bridge the shortcomings of member states. 
 
Another possible strategy to overcome the current account imbalances and problems of competitiveness in the 
Eurozone without first reducing nominal wages is that suggested in Carfì and Schilirò (2014). According to 
this view, based on a game theory model, it would be convenient for the Eurozone member countries to follow 
a co-petitive strategy based on the simultaneous interplay of cooperation and competition, where the different 
countries agree to cooperate regarding to some key variables (e.g. exports, foreign direct investments) in order 
to provide a win-win solution that is good for everyone and for the whole monetary union8. More specifically, 
the group of surplus countries of the Eurozone could contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to 
deficit countries and, in addition, the surplus countries should provide a certain amount of foreign direct 
(innovative) investments to improve the competitiveness of the countries of Eurozone, which are in a particular 
economic difficulty, as is the case of Greece (Carfì and Schilirò, 2014). 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 The current account balance is the sum of the balances of trade (in goods and services), primary income (dividends and interests on 
foreign investments plus salaries paid to/received by non-residents) and secondary income (remittances to/by foreign workers and 
contributions to EU institutions). 
5 At the same time, the divergence between the countries in the Eurozone has enlarged. This evidence has casted doubts on the 
effectiveness of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure introduced in 2011 with ‘six-pack’ legislation to obtain greater 
macroeconomic surveillance. 
6Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012), through an empirical analysis of these sudden stops in the euro area, stressed the role the balance of 
payment crisis. 
7 Sometimes, as in the case of Greece, wages went down but prices did not, because of lack of competition in the economy. 
8 In more detail, Carfì and Schilirò’s analytical model (2014) proposes a framework characterized by a cooperative bi-strategy based 
on two shared variables: export and FDI. The solutions offered in such co-petitive model aim at enlarging the amount of total payoff 
and sharing it fairly. 
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3.Banking union and monetary policy to counter the financial crisis 
 
During the crisis, relevant decisions were taken by the European authorities in order to stabilize the economies 
of the peripheral countries and the single currency. Thus, if we look at the evolution of governance in the 
Eurozone and consider the policies implemented during the years from the start of the euro crisis we face a 
changed environment. The ECB, after some attempts to support financial stability and improve the monetary 
transmission mechanism with limited effects, on 26 July 2012in the midst of a dramatic moment for the single 
currency announced, that the central bank “is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” moving in the 
direction of becoming a normal central bank (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016). Therefore, in September 2012, 
the ECB announced the purchasing programme Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), a non-standard 
measure of monetary policy to purchase, in secondary sovereign bond markets and under strict conditions, 
bonds issued by Eurozone member states. This was an example of a centralized provision of backstop facilities 
for sovereign debt markets. The OMT, although not tested, did work, mainly through the expectation channel, 
proving to be sufficient to contain the sovereign credit risk premia. Following these changes in order to make 
the Eurozone countries less divergent in terms of competitiveness, the doctrine of European authorities has 
been that national governments of member states should promote market competition, and to pursue fiscal 
discipline and supply-side reforms (Schilirò, 2014). Apart from the new fiscal regime (i.e. the “six-pack” and 
the ‘two-pack’ legislation, as well as the Fiscal Compact)9, the heads of state or government of EU countries 
and the European authorities agreed to create a Banking Union with the aim of constructing a more resilient 
system. Actually, the Banking Union is an important pillar of the new governance; it allows the transfer of 
banking sector policy from national to European level. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2016) observes that banking 
system stability constitutes a Eurozone-wide public good, which provides strongly increased returns. In fact, 
it is a major achievement since one of the main goals of the Banking Union is to break the connection between 
banks and sovereign debt (the “doom loop”). This nexus caused a steep increase in the refinancing cost of 
public debts in deeply indebted countries, reducing their anti-cycle fiscal capacity. The first step towards the 
Banking Union was the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) under Article 127 of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The SSM, which became operational in November 2014, locates the Supervisory Board within 
the European Central Bank (ECB), which assumes fundamental supervisory responsibilities for all banks in 
the Eurozone10. The SSM has already intervened to enhance the public good of financial stability, and more 
generally by pressing the banks it supervises to reduce home bias in their sovereign bond portfolios 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016).  A second fundamental step was the creation of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) for banks in the Eurozone countries. In case of bank failures, the SRM would provide 
appropriate solutions through rescue or liquidation11. Moreover, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) − Directive 2014/59/EU – was introduced by the European Parliament and the Council to provide a 
common mechanism12 for resolving bank failures in all the countries of the European Union, preventing the 
use of taxpayer money in bank bailouts in Europe, since it imposes a bail-in from the private sector. Thus, a 
single EU authority would have the powers to protect taxpayers from bank failures, ensuring the overall 
stability and transparency of the financial system in the Eurozone. However, in this agreement of Banking 
Union, common European regulators and national regulators coexist. Unfortunately, Banking Union remains 
unfinished, since it should encompass a centralized deposit insurance. In fact, the absence of deposit insurance 
can threaten confidence and financial stability throughout the monetary union (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 
2016, p.26). A European Deposit Insurance Guarantee Scheme should constitute the ‘third leg’ of the Banking 
Union, but despite the European Commission’s proposal13, several member states, including Germany, have 
expressed their opposition to the European Commission's plan. But a complete Banking Union with a 
mutualization of deposit insurance would also require some form of fiscal capacity (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 
2012; Obstfeld, 2013; Véron, 2015).  
 
 
                                                          
9 European Commission (2017). 
10Colliard (2014) has studied the optimal architecture of the single supervision mechanism (SSM) and argues there is a conflict of 
objectives between local and joint supervisors. 
11  The centralized decision making is built around a Single Resolution Board. Colon and Cotter (2015) provide an empirical analysis 
on SRM for European banks. 
12 Since 1 January 2015 all member states have to apply a single rulebook for the resolution of banks and large investment firms, as 
prescribed by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive under the supervision of the European Banking Authority. 
13 On 24 November 2015 the European Commission made a legislative proposal introducing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS) as a further step to a fully-fledged Banking Union. 
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Therefore, a true Banking Union should sit within some type of fiscal union, but understood in a limited sense 
and targeted at a specific financial problem associated with monetary union, not the centralization of fiscal 
functions at the level of the Eurozone (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016). Otherwise, given the current setup 
of the banking rules, the bank-sovereign vicious circle, which has been correctly identified as a key factor of 
instability, cannot be eliminated (Véron, 2015). In January 2015, the ECB confirmed its new role of a normal 
central bank in contrasting the crisis with its (unconventional) monetary policy by deciding a programme of 
quantitative easing (QE). The programme started on 9 March 2015 and it was named the Public-Sector 
Purchase Program (PSPP). The decision came after the ECB’s core target of inflation, “close to but under 2%”, 
was found to be far from the current state of inflation in the Eurozone. In fact, the Eurozone has officially been 
in deflation since January 2015. The QE programme committed the ECB to buying a certain amount of assets 
per month until September 201614. Later in December 2015, the ECB decided to extend the QE programme 
until March 2017, (in February 2017 there was a further extension until December 2017), since core inflation 
in the Eurozone was still below 1% and financial volatility high. With the QE, the main purposes of ECB are 
to stimulate lending, encourage investments, and to increase inflation expectations to the target of (nearly) 2%. 
Of course, the ECB's sole objective is the defence of price stability, and not even to support growth. Therefore, 
in the decision taken by the ECB there is not an explicit link between low growth and new monetary stimulus, 
but rather one between deflation and monetary easing (Schilirò, 2017). In practice, QE operates essentially 
through the portfolio channel by changing the mix of securities in the market, but also through the expectation 
channel. The empirical literature has widely demonstrated that central bank asset purchase has had 
economically significant effects, at least on governments bond yields15. There is also some worry that the flood 
of cash created by QE fuels asset bubbles and encourages reckless financial behaviour. In general, the lower 
yields and the lower long-term interest rates have somehow determined a positive effect on the economy; but 
the impact of QE on the economy is difficult to measure (Joyce et al., 2012).  However, Wieladek and Pascual 
(2016) find that the effect of ECB QE is roughly 2/3 times smaller than in the UK/US, but that in absence of 
the first round of ECB QE, real GDP and core CPI in the Eurozone would have been 1.3% and 0.9% lower, 
respectively16. In addition, during 2016, the unconventional monetary policy and the lower exchange rate of 
the euro have been conducive to enhancing the competitiveness of eurozone products outside the region, 
especially those member states which are strongly dependent on markets outside the Eurozone. The trade 
surplus has expanded significantly showing that the Eurozone economy is continuing to recover. There is also 
evidence that the unconventional monetary policy by ECB has had positive international spillovers on non-
euro countries in Europe (Horvath and Voslarova, 2017). Among the negative effects of QE, in particular, 
there is the asset shortages, less enthusiasm for structural reform by member states, risks of financial bubbles. 
The experience of QE in the US, UK and Japan suggests that to emerge from a profound crisis, like the one 
experienced in the Eurozone, monetary policy is not enough. What is needed is a balanced combination of 
monetary and fiscal policy (Posen, Ubide, 2014; Bini Smaghi, 2015; IMF, 2016). In conclusion, the 
unconventional monetary policy by the ECB have not only increased its balance sheet, but also expanded its 
role, becoming more and more a normal central bank. The QE has only had clear-cut effects on stimulating 
financial markets, while more time is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of QE. But, the benefits of large-
scale asset purchases outweigh their potential risks in terms of financial stability as Clayes and Leandro (2016) 
point out. On the whole, unconventional monetary policy has been important for the Eurozone economy, even 
if the effects of such monetary policy are still matter of debate among the economists. Indeed, the ECB has 
played a decisive role through its monetary policy to lead the Eurozone economy out of the crisis. But monetary 
policy can only be effective if structural problems in the Eurozone are tackled at the root. This is a matter of 
responsibility for national governments, which are called upon to engage more (e.g. consolidation of public 
finances, productivity improvements, enhancing competitiveness, strengthening of growth potential), whereas 
at European level more political efforts are needed. Although structural reforms to improve competitiveness 
are important, major emphasis should be given to innovation, improvement in human capital and growth-
promoting investment.  
 
 
                                                          
14 See Claeys, Leandro and Mandra (2015) for details of ECB’s QE. 
15The effects on the sovereign bonds of Italy and Spain since the start of the QE have been very clear and positive. There is instead less 
consensus on the transmission channels linking asset purchases with asset prices (Joyce et al., 2012). 
16These authors find that the policy is mostly transmitted through the portfolio balance, signaling, exchange rate and credit easing 
channels. The uncertainty channel does not seem to operate in the case of the ECB’s QE. 
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European authorities should pursue a forward-looking economic policy that reduces in equalities among the 
member countries, creating also more opportunity for the young people, in order to favour less divergence and 
growth. At present, the European Commission is softening austerity constraints applying more flexibility, with 
the precise aim of contrasting pro-cyclical policies and favouring investment (European Commission, 2016), 
leaving several Southern countries of Eurozone (e.g. Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain) space to boost 
their economies, while ECB has expanded and extended the QE programme until the end of 2017, so growth 
has come back in the Eurozone and improvements in several economic and financial indicators are good signs. 
But macroeconomic imbalances within the Eurozone are still present and the problem of Greece has not been 
entirely resolved. In conclusion, in this section, we have stressed the need of financial stability thatrequires 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies and the correct institutional design. Therefore, a complete banking 
union is an important part of this institutional design, whichwould require that the ECB’s lender of last resort 
role for banks should remain a regular feature of EMU in order to enhance its resilience (Obstfeld, 2013; 
Schilirò, 2014). Moreover, the banking union would require at least some centralized fiscal capacity (Pisani-
Ferry, Wolff, 2012; Obstfeld, 2013; Véron, 2015).  But this can be obtained without a complete fiscal union. 
In fact, a complete fiscal union is a problematic goal to achieve at present, and it is also unnecessary to complete 
the Banking Union as Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2016) point out. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the imbalances and assessed the policies of Eurozone during the crisis, underlining 
the flaws of the institutional framework. Imbalances have been analyzed with a focus on current account 
balances, banking union and monetary policy. A key point that emerged in the analysis is that competitiveness 
is not the main determinant of current account imbalances, but domestic demand and credit flows are other 
major factors. Moreover, there is evidence in the literature that increases in wages and downward rigidities of 
wages have lost their weight during the Eurozone crisis and are not the main cause of the loss of 
competitiveness in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone. In addition, a proposal of a strategy based on co-
petition that aims to help the exports of countries with deficits in current account and provide them with FDI 
can be the more effective solution in restoring the current account imbalances. Another important point that 
emerged from the analysis is that completion of the banking union is linked to some form of fiscal union, but 
this poses the question of democratic legitimacy of the European institutions. Furthermore, the paper has 
discussed proposals of new policies that would require changes in the European treaties. In conclusion, even 
though at present the Eurozone is experiencinga virtuous cycle, it needs to continue reforming its architecture 
and adapt its policies, since several crucial issues remain to get a more accomplished EMU, namely: the 
simplification of rules and the transparency of institutions, more flexibility in the common policies, a greater 
coordination of fiscal policy at Eurozone level, and political legitimacy. A new political effort is needed to 
bring Europe towards a path of increasing integration. The Eurozone needs a budget that can afford three 
specific functions: large-scale investments, financial assistance in emergencies, and countercyclical macro 
transfers. At present, the European Commission and the Eurozone institutions seem more aware of the need of 
pursuing a new phase of greater integration and stability. Therefore, Eurozone with the right reforms can 
become a monetary union characterized by less divergence, more stability and, above all, political credibility. 
 
Acknowledgements: I wish to thank David Carfì and Bruno Sergi for the helpful discussions and suggestions. 
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